Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 66

Issue 3

Article 6

2001

The Pilot Records Improvement Act of 1996: Unintended
Consequences
John J. Nance
Charles David Thompson

Recommended Citation
John J. Nance et al., The Pilot Records Improvement Act of 1996: Unintended Consequences, 66 J. AIR L.
& COM. 1225 (2001)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol66/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more
information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

THE PILOT RECORDS IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1996:
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES*
JOHN J. NANCE**
CHARLES DAVID THOMPSON***

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 1226
II. PILOT RECORDS IMPROVEMENT ACT .......... 1230
A. REASONS FOR CREATION ........................

1230

B.

1232

THE ACT AND

How

IT WORS IN THEORY .......

III. WHAT THE ACT DOES RIGHT ...................
IV. AREAS OF POSSIBLE AIR CARRIER LIABILITY..
V. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE
A CT ................................................
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES .................................

1236
1238
1240
1244

* This Article is written in the authors' personal capacities, and the views
herein should not necessarily be attributed to ABC Television Network, ABC
News, or the Harris County District Attorney's Office.
** John Nance is a graduate of SMU and SMU School of Law and is a licensed
attorney. He is a decorated Air Force pilot, veteran of Vietnam and Operation
Desert Storm/Desert Shield and a Lieutenant Colonel in the USAF Reserve. Mr.
Nance has piloted many jet aircraft, including Boeing 727s, 737s, 747s and Air
Force C-141s and logged over 13,000 hours of flight time. Mr. Nance flies his
own aircraft and holds the position of Boeing 737 captain with a major airline.
He is recognized as an air safety analyst and advocate, best known to television
audiences as Aviation Analyst for ABC Television Network and as the Aviation
Editor for Good Morning America. Mr. Nance is the author of twelve
internationally published best-selling books, two of which have been made into
television mini-series. Mr. Nance is a member of the JALC Board of Advisors, and
the Executive Board of the SMU School of Law.
*** Charles Thompson is a graduate of Baylor University and SMU School of
Law. Mr. Thompson practiced aviation insurance defense while an associate with
Maloney, Bean & Horn, P.C. and is currently a felony prosecutor with the Harris
County District Attorney's Office. He is also an active general aviation pilot.

1225

1226

JOURNAL OFAIR LAW AND COMMERCE
I.

INTRODUCTION

A

LONE, UNCERTAIN, and unsophisticated in the nuances
of law, a young regional airline captain sits nervously across the
desk from his chief pilot, absorbing a tirade of displeasure over his logging of an aircraftmaintenanceproblem the company had decided weeks
before to ignore.
"We don't need safety zealots around here!" the chief pilot
rails, angered further by the young pilot's refusal to accept the
company's opinion and drop the matter. "I told you last month
when you first wrote it up that maintenance says there's no
problem. Yet you've written it up two more times and caused
two delays!"
"Look, I'm not a safety zealot," the captain insists. "I'm just
trying to do what's right. If the FAA finds out about this, we're in
deep trouble, because we're endangering our passengers by letting that aircraft keep flying."
While hopefully an infrequent occurrence, exchanges of this
sort are an established reality in the world of airline flying. In
fact, occasional clashes between airline managers and airline pilots over what is and is not a safety problem are inevitable, given
the subjectivity of deciding how much safety is enough against
the background of economic competition.
However, despite historic regulatory efforts to equalize the coercive power of both parties in such disputes, the greater power
to force one interpretation over another obviously continues to
reside in the employer, especially insofar as he controls the
method, means, and expertise of ruling on a maintenance deficiency. The corresponding potential for balance-the pilot's
opinion-is highly discountable because the complaining pilot
is seldom in a position to counter the technical expertise of a
maintenance department or a flight administration department
on matters not governed by minimum equipment lists or other
specific rule or regulation.'
The potential for an off-balance clash failing to serve the conservative interests of aviation safety becomes especially acute in
smaller airlines, including regional carriers and those historiI See 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(a)-(b) (2000) ("The pilot in command of an aircraft is
directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that
aircraft. In an emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command
may deviate from any rule [in the Federal Aviation Regulations] .... "); 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.213(a)(4) (2000) (aircraft records must include entries for inoperable
equipment).
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cally known as commuters. This is particularly true where no
pilot association or union exists to back up a worried airman
who takes a position regarding safety of flight contrary to that of
management. Whether such a dispute is over an impending operation (a pilot seeking permission to ground an aircraft mistakenly loaded beyond maximum gross weight, or a pilot wanting
to cancel a flight in the face of questionable weather), or a less
time-critical matter (pilot concern over the safety of some policy
or procedure), it typically pits a young pilot with limited experience and limited resources in the first years of his or her aviation career against far more experienced managers who also
happen to hold the trump card of the pilot's job in their hands.2
Historically, a pilot in such a righteous clash could always
make the decision to resign or accept termination rather than
comply with what he or she considers a dangerous directive
("shut up and fly that airplane"). Prior to the mid-1990s, such a
newly jobless pilot could easily reapply to another air carrier of
similar size with the ability to control the means and extent of
explanation of the previous job separation or loss.' And the employer always retained the right to retrain, demote, or dismiss
the employee, such power tempered in theory by an aggrieved
pilot's right to sue for wrongful termination.'
Typically, non-union smaller carriers retain a level of freedom in hiring and
firing pilots not available to larger carriers whose pilots are subject to the procedural protections and limitations of union contracts and the Railway Labor Act.
See 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1996). In addition, since smaller carriers traditionally employ less experienced pilots essentially beginning their career, the rate of turnover-pilots leaving and being hired-is usually substantial. Before the passage of
Pilot Records Improvement Act (PRIA), this lent an air of casualness to the process of obtaining commuter jobs, resigning from them without consequence, and
even accepting an occasional firing without major concern. Now, however, enactment of PRIA has drastically changed the pilot's career penalty for being terminated, without reducing the commuter/ regional industry management mindset
that firing pilots is relatively routine and low risk disciplinary option.
3 Although, obviously, the propensity for such a pilot purposefully to hide or
obscure the basic fact of his or her departure from the previous job was one of
many factors leading to enactment of the PRIA. See CLARIFICATIONS TO PILOT
RECORDS IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1996, H.R. REP. No. 105-372, at 2 (1997) [hereinafter CLARIFICATIONS].
4 Having such rights tinder common law and having the practical means to
utilize such rights are two entirely different considerations. Many young commuter pilots make so little in salary that they technically qualify for food stamps,
and many are actively repaying loans ranging from $15,000-$70,000 taken out to
gain the aeronautical training necessary to qualify for any air-carrier position.
When such a pilot has a valid cause of action for wrongful termination, there are
two major problems: (a) financing the lawsuit, and (b) limited damages based on
salary projections for a commuter/regional pilot. Even if there is a good chance
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But what happens to this already off-balance equation when
the coercive power of the employer is dramatically increased,
and the pilot's rights of recovery-and even the rights of review
and correction of the record-are severely truncated? Clearly,
as the balance point shifts more in the direction of the employer
airline, the role of the pilot as an ultimate guardian of public
safety and the last line of defense against an unsafe flight becomes correspondingly more tenuous and ineffective.
Consider, for instance, the lack of public policy desirability of
legislatively changing the equation so as to increase the severity
of the penalty for being dismissed by any air carrier, however
small or poorly managed. Such a change hands the chief pilot
in the above scenario the ability to say the following to any of his
pilots who may be professionally dissatisfied with the company's
safety reaction:
"Okay, here's how it works. If we fire you, that dismissal goes
on your permanent pilot record here. Even if you resign, it's
our policy to consider you fired for cause and use the same inscription.5 Now, thanks to the new Pilot Records Improvement
Act of 1996, we're required by law to report that information for
five years to any other aviation operation that asks us for it, and
you're required by law to reveal to any airline you apply to that
you worked for us so that they can send us the reporting form.
So, there's no place to hide. Delta, American, United, Alaska,
or some other regional, are all going to know that you were
fired, and you'll have no chance of ever getting interviewed, let
alone hired. I mean, who'd want you? If something ever happened with you aboard, regardless of fault, the press and the
of recovery for the loss of an entire career, that career will be valued at the levels
of commuter/regional pay and may not amount to enough to offset the cost of
the suit. This is especially onerous and controlling when one is seeking a contingency arrangement with a competent firm or practitioner. Even at a relatively
high contingency percentage, a potential maximum recovery under $1 million
for a lost career is usually insufficient to secure an attorney under such arrangement. Correspondingly, paying directly to finance a wrongful termination suit
over a multi-year period through appeal is usually impossible for such pilots. The
result is a rather effective denial of access to a legal remedy at tort, exacerbated
by the interests of the Regional Airline Association members vigorously to resist
(through all levels of appeal) any such suit that could establish a "dangerous"
precedent and open the door for their pilot employees to file more such actions
in the future.
5 The inscriptions for dismissal vary widely, from a simple notation that a pilot
has been "dismissed" or "terminated," to a more specifically defined notation,
such as "terminated for unsatisfactory performance," "terminated for cause," or
"terminated-failure to satisfactorily complete required training."
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National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) would crucify
them for employing a pilot who'd been, quote, 'terminated for
unsatisfactory performance.'"
The chief pilot leans back, watching the look of utter defeat
on the captain's face.
"So, you go right ahead, captain, and be a zealot if you want.
I'll fire you on the spot, and that, friend, is the end of your career. And you want to know the best part? The law says we can't
be sued for just reporting what's on your record. So, repeat after me: There ...is... no... maintenance... problem... with
... ship 121."

The Pilot Records Improvement Act of 1996 (PRIA) 6 was
passed to promote safety among the ranks of America's airlines
by minimizing the potential that a dangerously flawed pilot
whose lack of competency had already been discovered at one
airline could be considered for subsequent employment by another airline that is unaware of his or her past professional history as recorded in those previous records.7 Unfortunately, just as
new pharmaceuticals approved by the Food and Drug Administration often generate unexpected (and often serious) side effects once released into the general market, the same is often
true of legislation, regardless of the purity of the drafters' intent.
It is specifically true of PRIA. While attempts were made to safeguard the interests of the occasional airman falsely accused of
incompetence on the record, the mere threat of receiving such
a poison pill notation has had three deleterious, and potentially
disastrous, side effects:
1) Providing a dramatic increase in the active coercive power
of the carrier by guaranteeing that any adverse notation a
carrier chooses to place on a pilot's record will cause catastrophic professional damage if he or she quits or is fired;
6 The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 3213, 3259-63
(1996) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44936(f) (1997 & Supp. 2000)).
7 Emphasis is to highlight the fact that the truth and accuracy of the pilot
records generated by any air carrier are uniquely unreliable due to: (a) the
highly subjective nature of the comments entered; (b) the utter lack of standardization requirements under the FAR's; and (c) the fact that in cases of termination, airline managers have a unilateral opportunity to form such records and
associated comments on airman proficiency so as to support their termination of
the pilot. There is no effective method or procedure within which a pilot may
reliably challenge such records or comments. See Michael E. Abrams, The Controversy Over Requiring Airlines and Other Employers to Share Pilot Records (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Journal of Air Law & Commerce).
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2) Providing a serious and undesirable disincentive for pilots
to uphold their responsibilities of independent professional discretion in air safety matters affecting them (passive coercive power); and
3) Creating an essentially unjust system wherein the very
means by which the unilateral pronouncements and determinations of an air carrier can permanently destroy a pilot's career are rendered unchallengeable, uncorrectable,
and effectively unappealable.
II.

PILOT RECORDS IMPROVEMENT ACT
A.

REASONS FOR CREATION

In seven fatal accidents involving scheduled airlines between
1987 and 1994, the NTSB found sufficient evidence to include
"pilot error" as part of the causal chain, and, grounds for concern about the pilot's backgrounds.8 Typically expressed in the
various accident reports as the "probable" cause or contributing
cause, the NTSB in each of these accidents tied causation to performance failures by one or more of the pilots, and in several
cases, even raised questions about a pilot's basic professional
suitability to be hired by the involved air carrier to begin with.9
A significant element of commonality among these accidents
was the failure of the employing airlines to secure complete emThe phrase "pilot error" is seldom used directly by the NTSB in accident
reports or factual findings. Instead, the Board utilizes phrases such as "The probable cause of this accident was the captain's failure to . . ." or "Contributing to
this failure was the copilot's failure to. ... ." While "pilot error" was the term of art
prior to the 1980s for almost any performance failure of a human pilot, major
advances in the understanding of human factors and human performance as a
sub-discipline of air-accident investigation has led the NTSB to be vastly more
careful and precise about labeling what is typically an unintentional human error
(deriving from the imperfection of human beings and the normal human
propensities for being imperfect) from an intentional or professional discretionary failure (such as intentionally landing with the wrong aerodynamic configuration). SeeJoHNJ. NANCE, BLIND TRUST (W.M. Morrow, 1986).
9 See CLARIFICATIONS, supra note 3, at 2. These accidents included (1) November 15, 1987, Continental Airlines crash at Denver, Colorado, where twenty passengers died; (2) January 19, 1988, Trans-Colorado Airlines crash at Durango,
Colorado, where seven passengers died; (3) February 19, 1988, AVAir crash near
Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina, where ten passengers died; (4) October 28,
1989, Aloha Island Air crash in Hawaii, where eighteen passengers died; (5) April
22, 1992, Scenic Air crash in Hawaii, where eight passengers died; (6) December
1993 Express II crash near Hibbing, Minnesota, where sixteen passengers died;
and (7) December 13, 1994, American Eagle crash near Raleigh-Durham, where
thirteen passengers died. Id.
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ployment histories of the pilots whose basic suitability had been
called into question.'l After four of the seven crashes, the NTSB
issued a specific recommendation that airlines be required to
obtain records of a pilot's previous performance before hiring
the pilot.' The first recommendation came in 1988 after the
crash of a Douglas DC-9 in Denver, Colorado. 12 The NTSB
learned from its investigation that the first officer's previous employer had fired him because of what the employer termed "unsatisfactory performance," a fact of which the accident airline
was unaware.' 3 In the cases of a 1990 commuter airline accident
and a 1993 Hawaiian air tour operator crash, the NTSB concluded that in both instances the employing air carrier's background checks were wholly insufficient to meet the burden of
protecting the public from incompetent pilots.' 4 But it was the
1994 crash of American Eagle Flight 3379, four miles short of
the runway at Raleigh-Durham International Airport following
an instrument approach in marginal weather conditions, that
suddenly grabbed the undivided attention of the federal government, as well as the media and the public.15 The NTSB investigation revealed that before American Eagle hired the captain,
he had been forced to quit by his previous airline employer due
to what that employer alleged were poor piloting skills. 6 The
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), however, refused to
take any action based on the NTSB's recommendations for a
better scheme of pilot pre-hire background research. 7
In 1995 the Subcommittee on Aviation of the House Committee of Transportation and Infrastructure held hearings regarding the issue of sharing pilot records among air carriers.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 John S. Yodice, Pilot Counsel: Pilot Record Sharing, AOPA PILOT, Feb. 1997
(the hiring operator did do a background check, however, he did not pick up the
unsatisfactory termination).

13 Id.
14

Id.

15 Id.
16 Id. It should be noted that the final NTSB report indicated that the pilot
responded exactly as he had been trained to react to the engine problem that was
a substantial factor in the accident. The aircraft manufacturer, and the charges
of incompetence on the captain's part left severely in doubt subsequently
changed the training procedures.
17 See CLARIFICATIONS, supra note 3, at 2.
18 Aviation Safety: Should Airlines Be Required to Share Pilot Performance Records?:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 104th Cong. 104-40 (1995).
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Overall, the testimony favored rapid legislative action to take the
place of FAA inaction. 9 In fact, the NTSB representative stated
that "[c]ommercial aircraft accidents are so rare to have four in
seven years attributable, even in part, to a single cause should
be, for everyone, conclusive evidence of a serious problem."2
The Committee approved the Airline Pilot Hiring and Safety Act
(H.R. 3536), which was passed in the House of Representatives
on July 22, 1996, by a vote of 401 to 0.21 The House bill was
combined with "The Pilot Records Improvement Act," a similar
Senate bill.2 2 This new Act was then incorporated2 3in the Federal
Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 as Title V.
B.

THE ACT AND How IT WORKS IN THEORY

PRIA requires an air carrier, 24 before allowing a new hire to
begin service as a pilot,25 to request and receive a large volume

of records. The hiring air carrier is required to request from
the FAA the pilot's license, medical certificate, type rating(s),
and any enforcement actions that resulted in a finding against
the pilot that has not been overturned. 26 PRIA further requires
IC Id.
20 Id.
21 See CLARIFICATIONS supra note 3, at 2.
22

Id.

Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat. 3213, 3259-63; see also 49 U.S.C. § 44936(f)
(1996).
24 Air carriers include FAA Part 121 Scheduled Commercial Operators (Major/National Regional Airlines); FAA Part 125 Commercial Cargo Operators; and
FAA Part 135 Non-Scheduled Commercial Operators (Regional Airlines, Charter
Operators). PRIA does not define the term "air carrier." However, 49 U.S.C.
§ 40102(a) (2) defines air carrier as "a citizen of the United States undertaking by
any means, directly or indirectly, to provide air transportation." Under 49 U.S.C.
§ 40102 (a) (25), interstate air transportation is defined as "the transportation of
passengers or property by aircraft as a common carrier for compensation ...
between a place in a State, territory, or possession of the United States." The
term "common carriage" has a specific meaning in court decisions defined by
"holding out" to the general public or to a segment of the public as being willing
to furnish air transportation for compensation. See Memorandum from Joseph
Conte on the Scope of the Pilots Records Improvement Act of 1996 to the U.S.
Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration (July 23, 1997)
(on file with author).
25 A 1997 amendment to PRIA changed "hiring an individual as a pilot" to
"allowing an individual to begin service as a pilot." H.R. 2626, 105th Cong.
(1997). This change allowed airlines to hire and begin training pilots before
receiving the pilot's records from previous employers. See CLARIFICATIONS, supra
note 3, at 4. This is same as the original version passed by the house (H.R. 3536).
Id.
26 See 49 U.S.C. § 44936(f) (1) (A) (i), (ii) (1996).
23
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an air carrier to request records from a pilot's previous employer,27 which would include proficiency and route checks, aircraft and route qualifications, training, physical exams, physical
or professional qualifications, drug tests, and alcohol tests.28
PRIA specifically requires that the prior employer provide any
"comments and evaluations made by check airman 2' 9 and "any
disciplinary action taken" by the air carrier that was not subsequently overturned. 3 ° Lastly, the prior employer must provide
27 The 1997 Amendment to PRIA modified the word "individual" by adding
after the word "as a pilot of a civil or public aircraft." Under this change, an
airline only has to request records from another business that employed that individual as a pilot of a non-military aircraft. See CLARIFICATIONS, supra note 3, at 4.
The law had previously been read to require a records request from all previous
employers for the past five years, such as a store where an individual worked as a
clerk. Id.
28 49 U.S.C. § 44936(f) (1) (B). See also 14 C.F.R. § 121.683 (These records include proficiency and route checks; airplane and route qualifications; training;
any required physical examinations; and actions taken concerning the release
from employment or physical or professional disqualifications of any flight
crewmember or aircraft dispatcher); 14 C.F.R. pt. 121, app. I § VI(A) (These
records include all records relating to the collection process [including all logbooks and certification statements]; records of employee confirmed positive drug
test results, Substance Abuse Professional evaluations, and employee rehabilitation; and records of negative test results); 14 C.F.R. pt. 121, app. J, § IV(A)
(These records include employee alcohol test results with results indicating an
alcohol concentration of 0.02 or greater; records related to other violations of 14
C.F.R. § 65.46(a) [alcohol misuse regulations applicable to employees who perform air traffic control duties] and sections 121.458 and 135.253 [ alcohol misuse
regulations applicable to employees who perform safety-sensitive functions in aviation, specifically AppendixJ to Part 121] documentation of refusals to take required alcohol test, employee evaluations and referrals, records related to the
collection process [except calibration of evidential breath testing devices] and
training; and records of all test results below 0.02); 14 C.F.R. § 125.410 (These
records include those that show whether the crew member is in compliance with
regulations governing his or her proficiency checks, airplane qualifications, and
any required physical examinations, and records concerning release from employment or physical or professional disqualification of any flight crewmember);
and 14 C.F.R. § 135.63(a)(4) (Part 135 requires each certificate holder to maintain an individual record of each pilot used in operations under this part, including full name of the pilot, the pilot certificate [by type and number] and ratings
that the pilot holds; the pilot's aeronautical experience; the effective date and
class of the medical certificate that the pilot holds; the date and results of each of
the initial and recurrent competency tests and proficiency and route checks required by Part 135 and the type of aircraft flown during the test or check; the
pilot's check pilot authorization, if any; any action taken concerning the pilot's
release from employment for physical or professional disqualification; and the
date of the completion of the initial phase and each recurrent phase of training
required by Part 135).
29 49 U.S.C. § 44936(f) (1) (B) (ii) (I) (2000).

30

Id. § 44936(f) (1)(B) (ii)(I1).
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any "release from employment or resignation, termination, or
disqualification with respect to employment."'" An employer is
also required to conduct a national drivers'3 2 license search regarding an applicant's prior driving history.
Employers are required under PRIA to maintain records of
employee pilots for a period of at least five years."3 An air carrier is prohibited from providing a response to a request if the
record was entered more than five years prior to the request
unless the information sought concerns the revocation or suspension of an airman certificate or motor vehicle license that is
in effect on the date of the request:"
PRIA requires that a written consent of the person who is the
subject of the PRIA request must be obtained. 5 If a pilot declines to provide written consent, it appears that the air carrier
could not hire him or her. 6 PRIA provides that an air carrier
may obtain a release of liability by stating as follows:
[N]ot withstanding any other provision of law or agreement to
the contrary, require the individual who is subject of the records
request to execute a release from liability for any claim arising
from the furnishing of such records ... by such air carrier (other
than a claim arising from furnishing information known to be
false and maintained in violation of a criminal statute)."

This release of liability has become standard practice in the
aviation industry. 8 Section 449 3 6(g) (1) of PRIA provides that
no action or proceeding may be brought by an individual who
has signed a release from liability "in the nature of an action for
defamation, invasion of privacy, negligence, interference with
contract, or otherwise, or under any Federal or State law with
31 Id. § 44936(f)(1)(B) (ii) (III).
32 Id. § 44936(f)(1)(C).
13 Id. § 44936(f) (4).
34 Id. § 44936(f)(3).
15

49 U.S.C. § 44936(f)(2), (5) (2000).

36 Id.

Id at § 44936(f) (2).
38 The typical release is worded as follows: "[IMMUNITY AND RELEASE
FROM LIABILITYPROVISION]: In accordance with 49 U.S.C. §§ 44936(f)(2) &
(g), I agree not to bring any action or proceeding in the nature of an action for
defamation, invasion of privacy, negligence, interference with contract, or otherwise under any Federal or State law with respect to the furnishing or use of such
records in accordance with the Pilot Records Improvement Act against any carrier, and its agent or employees who requests the records, or any carrier, company, organization or person, and their agent or employee who either enters the
information contained in my records or provides the information or records requested in Section II [Applicant's Signature, Date]."
37
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respect
to the furnishing or use of records" in accordance with
39
PRIA.

The records must be provided within 30 days from the date of
request." The pilot who is subject to the request must be informed within 20 days that records have been requested.4 The
pilot has the right to receive a copy of the records, but he must
make an affirmative request.42 Both the air carrier and the pilot
may be assessed a "reasonable charge" for the processing of requests and furnishing copies. Additionally, the FAA is allowed
to provide standard forms to request records, obtain written
consent of pilots and inform pilots of record requests.43
An air carrier who receives records pursuant to PRIA must
give the pilot applicant the right to review the records. 44 In addition, the pilot is required to be given a "reasonable opportunity" to submit written "comments" regarding perceived
inaccuracies prior to a hiring decision being made by an air
carrier.4 5
PRIA attempts to protect the privacy rights of the pilot by requiring that any records obtained under PRIA can only be used
in the hiring process.46 The air carrier is required to take "such
actions as may be necessary to . . . ensur[e] that information

contained in the records is not divulged to any individual that is
not directly involved in the hiring decision.

'47

Subsection

(g) (2) of PRIA preempts any State or political subdivision
from
48
PRIA.
affecting
ordinances
or
laws
any
passing
This is a basic primer regarding the statutory framework of
PRIA, and how, in a vacuum, it was meant to operate. The complexities of this law, however, have spawned a small cottage industry of firms charging fees to help airlines with the challenges,
vagaries, and hazards of PRIA compliance. In fact, the gulf between congressional intent and practical application is proving
wider than the most pessimistic expectations of lawmakers as
their best intentions become increasingly obscured by dense
39 49 U.S.C. § 44936(g)(1) (2000).
40

41
42
4.
44
446

Id. § 44936(f) (5).
Id. § 44936(f) (6) (A).
Id. § 44936(f) (6) (B).
Id. § 44936(f) (8).
Id. § 44936(f) (10).
49 U.S.C. § 44936(f)(9) (2000).
Id. § 44936(f) (11).

47 Id.
48

Id. §

44936

(g) (2).
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and unyielding statutory construction and, as demonstrated
later in this article, by the unintended, potentially ruinous consequences for honest and competent pilots. Complicating the
equation with a degree of urgency is the fact that the unintended consequences of PRIA have created the possibility that the Act itself has
spawned a wholly unintended new danger to public safety.
III.

WHAT THE ACT DOES RIGHT

PRIA clearly promotes/compels thorough professional background checks of pilots who will be flying for air carriers under
Parts 121, 125, or 135. Prior to PRIA, employers had a basic
due-diligence incentive to perform background checks, but such
checks were not compelled by specific statute or regulation.
When such checks were performed, the effectiveness of such efforts was questionable where previous employers, unprotected
by specific indemnifications, too often refrained from reporting
negative information about a pilot for fear of legal reprisals.49
Under the current scheme, an employer has a substantially
greater chance of screening out professionally substandard pilot
applicants with the aid of PRIA-required records, the potential
frankness and accuracy of which are greatly enhanced by the
statutory indemnification and specific direction afforded the reporting carrier.
In regard to statutory indemnification, the Act provides that a
pilot applicant must give a written waiver for an employer to
obtain his or her pilot records, and must be notified when the
records are obtained." Under the Act, and without regard to
practicality or method, the applicant/former employee is given
the statutory right to review the records and make comments
regarding inaccuracies.
The Act does not provide a specifically required framework or procedure with which an applicant
can pursue such reviews, however, nor does it provide a formalized method by which the effectiveness of any such added comments by a pilot may be assured. This means that the pilot
applicant is subject to the interpretations and good will of both
the former airline and the one to which he or she is applying.
The Act also puts a five-year time limit on how long the records
4.1 See HAI Press Release, National Air Transportation Association, The Pilot
Record Sharing Law: What it is and How to Comply? (on file with author).
-,, See 49 U.S.C. § 44936(f) (2), (6) (A).
51 Id. § 44936(f)(10)

20011

PILOT RECORDS IMPROVEMENT ACT

1237

must be maintained.52 Further, the Act states that the records
can only be used for hiring decisions. 5 These facets of PRIA
make sense in the grand scheme of public/operational safety
versus the rights of pilots and have the potential to work in a
perfect world where human nature and economic pressures
need not be considered. Where such factors are considered,
however, there are obvious omissions in the Act.
PRIA places a tremendous burden on Part 135 air carriers in
particular to obtain the required pilot hiring information, even
though that requirement is obviously justified in principle as
public policy by the overriding goal of ensuring public safety.54
Part 135 carriers and small cargo carriers are at the sharp end of
the airline economic equation, and their often marginal profitability typically results in greater daily pressure on management
and line personnel to hold down costs. In such an environment,
the potential for imposing or encouraging cost-controls, which
inadvertently diminish safety margins becomes generically
greater than in the more stable economic and internal-regulatory atmosphere provided by the larger Part 121 carriers. In a
Part 135 atmosphere of cost and performance pressure, the federal air regulations have long contemplated the role of the pilotin-command as being a last line of defense for passenger safety
in that the pilot-in-command has the ultimate authority to decide whether a flight operation is safe or unsafe. Indeed, the
pilot-in-command is the pilot "responsible for the operation and
safety" of an aircraft during flight time. 55 But there is a concurrent and equally important public policy goal requiring consideration of the "real world" operation of a law affecting public
safety in lieu of blindly trusting that the original congressional
intent is being realized. It is the dichotomy of this very comparison in the case of the PRIA that raises the potential need for
urgent amendment due to the unforeseen and undesirable effects it may be having on the very air safety system it was promulgated to enhance.

52

Id. § 44936(f) (4).

53 ld. § 44936 (f) (11).
54 See National Air Transportation Association, supra note 49.
55 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2000) (The pilot-in-command is essentially responsible for

complete and undiminished compliance with each and every provision of the
federal air regulations).

1238

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
IV.

AREAS OF POSSIBLE AIR CARRIER LIABILITY

PRIA does not provide an all-encompassing bar to liability for
air carriers. In fact, PRIA leaves significant liability traps, which
can too easily snare an unwitting or poorly advised air carrier
that relies on the assumption that the waiver of liability sought
from each applicant affords absolute protection. Indeed, the
Act does provide a broad immunity, but that immunity is not
ultimately statutory: it is based on the applicant's executed
waiver, a document benefiting solely the employer, and one that
air carriers are given the authority to request. 56 In practice,
there are no requests: all pilot applicants are required to sign
the airline's waiver if they want their application seriously considered. Thus, the resulting "grant" of immunity by applicants is
all but universal and possibly subject to later attack from the
applicant on the grounds that severe economic diversity between the pilot applicant and the airline invalidates a release
obtained by procedural coercion.5 7
Other traps, however, spring from the well of incomplete legislative protection. An air carrier, for example, would not be
protected from liability if pilot records obtained under the authority of PRIA were used for purposes not contemplated in the
Act, such as a use not reasonably involved in the decisional process of personnel selection."
If, for instance, a pilot's PRIA
records were maintained in his or her personnel file and those
records were later used in any material way to deny a promotion
or intensify a disciplinary decision, the air carrier could be recovered against for such misuse. Additionally, the PRIA immunity provisions do not bar suits brought by one air carrier
against another, but seek only to protect the employer from its
applicant. 9 Thus if a prior employer-carrier fails to disclose to a
second employing air carrier relevant information about the dismissal of a pilot, the second air carrier could assert various
forms of liability against the first, especially in the event of an
accident or incident in which the second carrier has an interest
16 See 49 U.S.C. § 44936(f) (2).
57 Apparently no cases have yet arisen utilizing this theory in an attempt to
permit a recovery against an air carrier by sweeping away the validity of the applicant release, but the lopsided nature of the release's imposition should raise caution flags.
- See 49 U.S.C. § 44936(f)(11); see also National Air Transport Association,
supra note 49, at 9.
59 See 49 U.S.C. § 44936(f) (2); see also National Air Transport Association, supra
note 49, at 10.
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in shifting or sharing third-party liability. This places a heavy
burden on the reporting carrier to be extremely thorough and
deliberate in its performance when responding to another carrier's PRIA request.
There also appears to be no immunity where an air carrier
fails to send records and such inaction materially and adversely
impacts the applicant's career. 6' A pilot not hired may have an
incentive to seek redress from his or her former air carrier when
that former employer has failed to provide a timely response to
a PRIA request. Interestingly enough, however, a partial transmittal of prior records would appear to be covered by the immunity provision.61 Further, a prior employer risks liability to the
applicant if it fails to send records in a timely fashion on the
grounds that the fee charged for providing such records has not
been received.6 2 Response by the former employer air carrier
within the thirty-day period is mandatory regardless of form or
sufficiency of payment.6"
Responses by non-employers appear not to be covered by
PRIA's grant of immunity.64 If, for example, a flight academy
responds to a PRIA request regarding a former student, no protection is afforded as against that student. It also appears that
the immunity only covers written documents.6 5 Oral disclosures
regarding a pilot would not be covered.66 Entries made in a pilot's records after he or she left employment would not be
67

covered.

Uncertainties exist as well with companies or corporate flight
departments operating under Part 91.68 Such operations are

not required under Part 91 to keep the type of pilot records
contemplated by PRIA. However, if the operator does elect to
keep records, thus serving the public interest by complying with
a higher standard, there appears to be a corresponding responsibility imposed by PRIA requiring that operator to divulge any
-0 See National Air Transport Association, supra note 49, at 10.
61 Id.
62 Id.

63 See 49 U.S.C. § 44936(f)(5); see also National Air Transport Association, supra
note 49, at 9.
64 See National Air Transport Association, supra note 49, at 10.
65 See 49 U.S.C. § 44936(f)(4).
66 See National Air Transport Association, supra note 49, at 10.
67 Id. at 9.
68 See Conte, supra note 24
(FAA interpretation that Part 91 carriers are
covered).
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such records in response to a PRIA request.69 The disclosing
company, once in compliance with the disclosure requirement,
would appear to be protected to the same degree as a Part 135
or 121 carrier, but a specific statement in the Act of protection
in that case would be helpful.
As with most new legislation, the principal difficulty in arriving at precise interpretations of PRIA is the lack of case law settling various potential challenges. While clearly grounded in
the broad public policy interest in protecting public safety, not
every question of applicability and protection can be correctly
answered by defaulting to the most safety-conservative interpretation. This caution is valid because the operation of the PRIA
disclosure requirements also materially impacts, and may directly damage or destroy, the careers of pilots who have in most
cases invested many years and considerable funds in achieving
what may be lost with a single PRIA response. Given the equally
important public policy concerns that individuals not have their
livelihood wrongly or negligently damaged or destroyed by mistake or illicit design, the need for greater precision in PRIA's
provisions to minimize the gaps that currently exist in protection of both air carriers and applicants seems obvious. That, of
necessity, means that the Act must be carefully and rapidly
amended to achieve its original purpose of providing appropriate protection to all parties affected, especially since such "appropriate protection" is unlikely to arise from litigation.
V.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACT

As indicated above, the goal of PRIA is to provide air carriers
with a substantially more accurate method of assessing the aeronautical abilities of pilot applicants by creating a system requiring examination of the records of a pilot's performance with
previous employers. In establishing this new system in the interest of minimizing the chance of an air carrier hiring substandard pilots, Congress inaccurately assumed the presence of a
nonexistent uniformity in the accuracy, honesty, and standards
used in preparation of air carrier pilot records. Since all assessments made under the resulting PRIA system can be no better
than the records that form the basis of that system, the failure to
standardize the form and content of such record keeping, the
failure to protect airmen against incorrect records adversely im6" See Linda L. Martin, EvaluatingPilot Performance,Bus. & COMM'L AVIATION 96
(1998).
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pacting their careers, and the failure to provide stiff penalties to
air carriers who knowingly permit frivolous, false, or otherwise
incorrect information to be included in such records seriously
compromises the integrity of the results. In addition, these failures both unfairly impact certified commercial airmen, and dangerously upset the balance of coercive power between the
employing air carrier and an individual pilot who objects in the
interests of safety to some procedure or operation favored by
the air carrier.
The compromising nature of the present PRIA system can be
seen most clearly in situations involving a pilot terminated for
what he or she believes was an uncompromising safety decision.
Clearly, the objectivity of the resulting notation in the pilot's record of employment will depend entirely on the largess and fairness of an air carrier that has already taken a firm stance against
the pilot's actions. Logically and generically then, such circumstance has little chance of generating a fair assessment of the
airman's action, and may, in fact, ruin or destroy the career of
an otherwise superlative certificate-holding pilot whose sole offense was to uphold the public's overriding interest in being the
last line of defense in airline safety (for example, refusing to fly
without de-icing an ice-encrusted commuter aircraft, despite the
significant cost, which, in some cases, can be thousands of dollars). Equally disturbing is the inherent injustice of creating a
system in which the opinion and attitude of the air carrier, right
or wrong, becomes effectively unchallengeable due to the reality
of the application of a federal law. Under PRIA, an airman terminated for almost any reason becomes a pariah in the industry
without any practical opportunity of correcting the record, even
where solid evidence exists that the firing was unjust. Correspondingly, insertion of wrong or unfair negative comments regarding a pilot's airmanship can become a means of forcing that
pilot to remain in the inscribing air carrier's employ, since the
presence of such comments effectively negates the pilot's ability
to quit and go elsewhere. Whether a true perception or not,
PRIA's effect has severely heightened the apprehension among
pilots that they have few, if any, choices regarding their own employment. PRIA, in other words, has become in the minds of
beginning airline pilots a Sword of Damocles hanging over their
heads, a weapon controlled solely by the air carrier.
The multiple problems with PRIA's effective application
merely begin with the utter lack of standardization in the form
and content of the pilot records promulgated and exchanged
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under the Act."' Under the current law, there is no way to measure the strength or validity of any comments made by a prioremploying air carrier in a pilot's records. 7 A comment made by
a check airman could be made for political, discriminatory, malicious, or mistaken reasons.7 2 Disciplinary actions may have
been taken by an unscrupulous air carrier to intimidate a strongwilled, safety-minded pilot and keep him or her in check.7"
Training records may reflect negatively on a pilot when in reality
the entries were made to cover a lax instructor, substandard
training methods, or unacceptable and unfair disruptions in the
training curriculum."
PRIA does provide a formalized opportunity for the pilot to
add a comment to any entries that were made in records.7 5 That
method, however, provides no practical procedure for correcting wrong or unjust entries, and given the uselessness of trying to explain away a blemish to a future air-carrier employer,
thus provides no remedy at all. Specifically, PRIA's provision for
including a corrective or dissenting comment is useless because,
in today's litigious environment, few (if any) air carriers are
brave enough to risk hiring a pilot with a blemished record
when so many other pilots are available with unblemished histories.7 6 Even a cogent and corrective explanation in the pilot's
record of some operational or training blemish, or of a dismissal, will be almost universally insufficient to convince the airline.
In the eyes of the would-be hiring air carrier, hiring such a pilot
opens them to additional liability, since a future plaintiff might
assert that there was clear negligence in the mere act of hiring a
pilot whose records reflected even a rebuttable presumption of
substandard performance somewhere in the previous five years.
Additionally, an air carrier is neither required, nor generically
See Abrams, supra note 7, at 1.
Id. at 7.
72 Id.
73 Id. The flight administrative culture at Air Illinois in Carbondale, Illinois, in
the mid-1980s provides a disturbing example of an airline that permitted a cockpit culture to develop that effectively supported direct FAR violations and unacceptable risk-taking and intimidated the attempts of any copilots who dared
oppose a risk-taking captain. The NTSB final report on the crash of Air Illinois
Flight 710 on October 11, 1983, near Pinckneyville, Illinois, reflected a host of
cultural problems with the airline and the resulting pressures on nonconforming
aircrew members to conform to attitudes, methods, and procedures that ranged
from non-conservative to violative.
70

71

74

Id.

77,1

See 49 U.S.C. § 44936(f) (9).
See Abrams, supra note 7, at 8.
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inclined, to believe the correctness of an applicant's record correction comments, or for that matter even to consider them or
agree to do any further investigation."
By passing the PRIA, Congress has unwittingly given unscrupulous
and careless aircarriers alike the ultimate club with which to beat a pilot
who would dare to disagree on any number of issues. The operator
can blemish a pilot's record for five years and essentially destroy
his or her career. In the competitive struggle to earn enough
experience (flight time) to qualify for a pilot position with a major airline, a single blemish can, and does, effectively terminate
the quest. Pilots and operators fully understand this and operators seldom have to directly threaten pilots with the consequences of bucking their authority. The operator can effectively
ruin a career with the stroke of a pen, and the operator will be
immunized from liability in doing so because the applicant has
signed the "required" release under PRIA, an act over which he
or she has no real choice. Additionally, a young pilot will seldom if ever be in a financial position to litigate the issue of a
false or patently unfair and unsupportable record entry. Even if
a pilot were financially secure enough to finance litigation (the
costs of which could easily exceed $100,000), the time involved
to resolve a lawsuit of this nature, and the absence of a statutory
or procedural method of accelerating such litigation, effectively
eliminates any real chance that the pilot will ever be hired as an
airline pilot again. The time lost in flight operations is particularly detrimental since most large airlines put a premium on current flight experience and tend to reject even the most qualified
applicants who have not flown actively for the length of time
litigation would take (18-36 months).
Additionally, there are no structured procedures under PRIA
for reviewing and, where appropriate, correcting an entry in a
PRIA record. This deficiency has the unintended consequence
of violently shifting the balance of power away from the safetyoriented pilot to the air carrier, and the air carrier will always
be, by nature, profit driven and desirous of minimizing expenses. That dynamic continually tests the limits of what is and
is not acceptable in the interest of flight safety. The interests of
flight safety therefore demand the independent oversight of an
ultimate on-scene safety monitor, a task assigned by the FAR's to
the pilot in command. PRIA's unintended but radical shift in
coercive power, as a matter of logic, puts the flying public at risk.
77

See id. at 10.
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While it is certainly true that most air carriers not only refrain
from the conduct discussed in this article, but struggle to ferret
out and prevent such attitudes from becoming established,
human nature and economics dictate that the potential clearly
exists for PRIA to provide a weapon to those exceptions in the
air carrier community who would act against a pilot who refused
to accept the company solution to every safety problem. If just
one air carrier, however large or small, does in fact use PRIA as
a "club" to mute a safety-oriented pilot, that single occurrence is
unacceptable as a systemic matter in the United States and virtually mandates a change in PRIA's provisions. A rapid legislative
initiative is therefore required to restore the balance of power
for the benefit of the flying public, and more specifically, to permit PRIA to accomplish the beneficial and needed reforms for
which it was passed.
VI.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

The most destructive deficiency of PRIA is the utter lack of
protection it affords pilot applicants from the disastrous effects
of any incorrect information contained in records of previous
employment. Therefore, the Act should be amended to incorporate a new statutory scheme within which timely challenges
and, where appropriate, corrections can be made. The competing interests that must be balanced here are the legitimate
needs of pilot applicants to correct detrimentally inaccurate information and expunge false characterizations of pilot performance, versus the need of the potential employer (as the steward
of airline safety) to ascertain true and fair characterizations of
the applicant pilot's prior performance and quality. If the pilot
applicant is given a method of record-challenge and correction
that essentially penalizes the former employer for inscribing any
negative information (penalties in the form of forcing expenditures of company time and resources to defend or support their
record inscriptions regardless of veracity), the balance of coercive power may be shifted disastrously in favor of the pilot. In
such case, the pilot could theoretically discourage a current employer from notation of even correct derogatory information by
merely having the statutory right to involve the employer in a
formal challenge at will and without penalty. Thus, whatever
scheme is constructed should carry some inherent penalty enforceable against the pilot for frivolous filings or purposeful misuse of the right of challenge. On the other hand, any new
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method of challenging a record's accuracy will fail if pilots who
are unable to afford legal counsel or a lengthy appeals process
do not tailor it to be easy to use in practical terms. Since, as
previously stated, many pilot applicants in need of a system of
challenge will be unemployed, frightened of extracurricular industry retaliation or "blackballing," legally unsophisticated, legally unrepresented, and possessed of little if any monetary
reserves, a formal system that involves attorneys and depositions
and all the usual accouterments of legal actions will be useless
and inaccessible. Instead, the concept underlying the nationwide creation of "small claims courts" in the form of a specific
hearing should be looked to as an example in principle of what is
needed here:
1. The method of challenge should not require, or permit, the use of
lawyers at its primary level. Any company operating as an air carrier will already have extensive access to good legal counsel,
while the pilot applicant may be unable to hire any but the most
inexpensive and least experienced lawyers. The intimidating effect of such an imbalance is obvious and immediately
prejudicial.
2. The challenge or request for review and revision should begin
with the filing of a simple complaint in any coherent writtenform by the
pilot applicant,and such filing should be made by the pilot applicant himself or herself. Argument by the pilot of precisely what
is in his or her record is inaccurate, and factual testimony to explain why, should be presented directly by the pilot, the veracity
of such testimony to be subject to both penalty of perjury and
the penalty7 8 of FAA license revocation for making a false material
statement.
3. The statutoy scheme must select the most neutral, least formal,
and most respected "hearing-examiner"methodology possible. This precludes the FAA serving in such a capacity, as the FAA is inevitably an interested party. (In fact, to include the FAA-let alone
to permit the FAA to utilize anything discovered in the process
of appeal as grounds for disciplinary or exclusionary actionwould destroy the usability of the system and cast a pall of danger over the otherwise simple act of requesting a record revision.) In addition, the NTSB should also not serve as the forum
78

New enabling language in the FAR's may be necessary to implement this.
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of this review process since the NTSB has a long and uncomfortable history of processing appeals from FAA certificate actions
(and doing so with only an occasional ruling against the FAA).
Considering the widespread lack of airman trust of the NTSBFAA appeals process, or the administrative law process, assigning such a new and subjective responsibility to the NTSB
would tend to discourage pilots from using it.
One significant possibility would be the creation and certification of a special class of mediator to handle record appeals
under a revised PRIA. Under strict guidelines and controls
mandating neutrality and proscribing conflict-of-interest entanglements, such mediators, on a freelance basis, could conduct
minimally formal hearings. As a result of their findings, such
mediators should render rapid decisions under a strict timetable
or, at their discretion, require additional information from the
air carrier or the pilot applicant. The losing party should pay
the compensation of such a mediator. In other words, if an air
carrier's records are changed or amended as a result of the findings of such a hearing, the air carrier must immediately pay the
costs of the mediation, regardless of whether the records were
wrong due to mistake or purposeful action. Correspondingly,
an unsuccessful pilot applicant appellant must pay the costs.
The mediator should also have the authority to cite a pilot applicant for a frivolous appeal and impose a substantial monetary
penalty, as well as perhaps authorize a report of such finding to
be affixed to the pilot's records held and reported by the former
employer. The use of this procedure, in other words, would not
be without risk to the pilot applicant if, in fact, there was no
reasonable basis for seeking review and change of his or her
records.
4. The burden of proof that the air carrier'srecord of pilot performance is correct should be on the air carrier, not the pilot. Due to the
vast difference in coercive power between the pilot and the employer and the potentially disastrous consequences of inaccurate
prejudicial inscriptions, and the superior skills and reporting requirements vested in and expected of the air carrier, the air carrier should at all times be able to bear this burden with ease
when the pilot records are accurate. In fact, any derogatory information on a pilot file should trigger such an internal test in
each and every case in anticipation that a challenge will require
the same level of documentation and validating testimony of the
check airmen and administrative personnel involved. If the im-
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position of such a review process as contemplated here has the
effect of putting all air carriers on notice that they must be vastly
more careful, deliberate, and fair in their preparation of pilot
records, then a large measure of the corrective intent of these
recommended amendments will have been achieved from the
start.
5. The mediator or examiner must be statutorily proscribedfrom using the superior administrative, supervisory, or operational abilities of
the air carrieror its personnel as groundsfor imputing a presumption of
correctness or accuracy to any derogatory information on a pilot's file.
Challenges by a pilot to the accuracy of his or her record with a
prior employer should be judged by the hearing examiner or
mediator on the basis of the entirety of the statements, documents, and evidence presented, as measured against the background of normal daily air-carrier operations and training.
6. While formal discovery and subpoena processes should
not be used or permitted, both the pilot and the air carriershould be
required to produce all applicable documents voluntarily and without
alteration. Subsequent proof that an air carrier failed to do so
should give rise to accelerated damages in any formal lawsuit,
and that fact alone should terminate any defense the air carrier
might otherwise have had that it was released from liability
under the provisions of PRIA.
7. The pilot should have the right to require the presence of and to
question and require the explanation and defense of those air-carrier
personnel directly involved in the notation of the objected-to information
on his record. Such individuals may not substitute counsel for
their personal appearance, since the point of this provision is to
provide the pilot the chance to confront his or her accuser, consistent with a basic principle of American jurisprudence. (To
this extent, written assertion of professional incapacity or poor
performance on a record that could end or damage a pilot's
career becomes, pro forma, an accusation, regardless of the accuracy or the authorized methodology under which it is made).
8. If an air carrierloses such a challenge, it should immediately, in
accordancewith the hearing examiner or mediator's instructions, appropriately alter the pilot's permanent record and provide him or her with
three certified copies. Transmittal of the former, subsequently disallowed inscriptions under PRIA should subject the carrier to
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treble damages and should remove all protection from liability
under the Act.
9. Appeals from decisions under this process should be at
the peril of the appellant. Appeal could be taken by either party directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
precisely the same manner as an appealfrom a ruling of the Merit Systems Protection Board, but a failed appeal by a pilot should result
in imposition of all attorney and court costs on that appellant.
Methodology: The procedural alterations to the Act should include
the following requirements:
When a pilot leaves employment with an air carrier for any
reason, voluntary or otherwise, the carrier must, within 30 days,
provide the pilot with a full and complete copy of the records
precisely as they would be forwarded under a PRIA request, accompanied by a business records affidavit. A purposeful furnishing of record copies containing material alterations from the
record copies that would be forwarded under PRIA should subject the carrier to treble damages in any applicable tort action
based on that conduct. The pilot should have six months from
the date of receipt of such copies within which to file a protest
or demand with the air carrier for correction or expungement
of notations on the provided records that he or she believes are
in error, such letter to include the address where the air carrier's formal response must be sent. In the event an air carrier
fails to provide such records on separation or termination in accordance with this procedure, there should be no limit on when
the pilot may make a subsequent demand for record correction
or avail him- or herself of the provisions of PRIA. Additionally,
failure by an air carrier to provide the records in accordance
with the foregoing should place the carrier "at risk" without the
statutory liability protection of PRIA if derogatory information is
subsequently found to be false or incorrect, without reference to
knowledge or intent.
The air carrier should have 20 days from certified receipt of
such a protest and notification to either make the requested alterations, or notify the pilot that it refuses to do so. Alternatively, the carrier may request of the pilot, and the pilot at his or
her option may agree to, a conference between pilot and carrier
for the purpose of reaching a reasonable compromise on reformation of the records in accordance with the pilot's objection.
Such a good-faith meeting must nevertheless be held within 30
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days of the pilot's request. If agreement is not reached, the carrier then should have 10 days within which to furnish the pilot
with a certified notification that it refuses to alter the pilot's
records as the pilot demanded. Failure of an air carrier to respond in a timely fashion to these required actions removes any
bar to suit by the pilot under PRIA for defamation or any other
associated theory of liability. Any rejection of a pilot's demanded changes must be accompanied by a statement of why
the air carrier believes the records are both correct and defensible, and must include citation of the names of the personnel
who were directly involved in making the initial inscription and
the decision not to alter them. It should be the responsibility of
the air carrier to send the notification to the airman at the address given on the airman's protest or demand letter, or, if
none is given, by sending it certified mail to the last address on
the pilot's license. 79 A subsequent finding by a mediator, or any
court of competent jurisdiction, that an air carrier has clearly
manipulated the foregoing requirements in bad faith for purposes of thwarting this Act or illicitly frustrating the pilot's rights
under this Act should subject the carrier to treble damages.
Correspondingly, once a pilot has initiated an action under
these modified provisions for review and alteration of records
alleged to be false or incorrect, any purposeful action in bad
faith by an air carrier to fail to comply by withholding records of
personnel or otherwise purposely attempting to frustrate the
process should subject the carrier to treble damages. This prohibition includes any purposeful act of hiding, obscuring, obstructing, or otherwise failing to voluntarily produce
information relevant to the request for change of record. While
no statutory scheme involving human institutions can perfectly
insure against purposeful frustration or sabotage, the threat of
treble damages arising from some subsequent formal court action would substantially improve the possibility that such a "full
voluntary disclosure of documents" requirement has a substantial chance of being effective.
It should be noted that the foregoing postulated alterations to
PRIA, and the promulgation of a methodology for direct and
more simplified application for record change vested in a pilot
whose career is on the line, have been weighted heavily in favor
of the pilot in order to equalize both the imbalance of economic
79 See 14 C.F.R. § 61.60 (2000). In order to maintain a valid pilot certificate,
the holder must notify the FAA within thirty days of a change of address.
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power and the overall imbalance of coercive power in favor of
the air carrier in virtually every instance. The basic principle to
be followed here if PRIA is to be repaired and made as fair as it
is effective for all interests is simply this: A rapid, inexpensive,
effective, and utterly fair examination by a scrupulously unbiased mediator is to be considered vastly superior to a system of
"appeal" which is essentially unusable by the potential appellant
pilot (due to economic realities) or essentially untrustworthy in
the eyes of the pilot community (due to built-in bias favoring
the acts of the magisterial authority of an air carrier).
PRIA in its present form is dangerously flawed, and immediate
amendment to correct the deficiencies identified herein are, quite literally,
a matter of safety directly affecting the public interest.

